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Abstract
Recent works succeeded to generate adversarial pertur-
bations on the entire image or the object of interests to cor-
rupt CNN based object detectors. In this paper, we focus on
exploring the vulnerability of the Single Shot Module (SSM)
commonly used in recent object detectors, by adding small
perturbations to patches in the background outside the ob-
ject. The SSM is referred to the Region Proposal Network
used in a two-stage object detector or the single-stage ob-
ject detector itself. The SSM is typically a fully convolu-
tional neural network which generates output in a single
forward pass. Due to the excessive convolutions used in
SSM, the actual receptive field is larger than the object it-
self. As such, we propose a novel method to corrupt object
detectors by generating imperceptible patches only in the
background. Our method can find a few background patches
for perturbation, which can effectively decrease true posi-
tives and dramatically increase false positives. Efficacy is
demonstrated on 5 two-stage object detectors and 8 single-
stage object detectors on the MS COCO 2014 dataset. Re-
sults indicate that perturbations with small distortions out-
side the bounding box of object region can still severely
damage the detection performance.
1. Introduction
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) are shown to be
vulnerable against adversarial perturbations [10], which
are intentionally designed and imperceptible noise added to
the input that can drastically affect network performance.
Many works [30, 10, 14, 25, 24, 23, 33, 22, 2, 6] have in-
vestigated this vulnerability and proposed various adversar-
ial attack methods to impair image classifiers.
Recently, adversarial perturbations are extended to net-
works for other computer vision tasks such as the ob-
ject detectors and semantic/instance segmentation networks
[20, 32, 4, 21, 7, 15]. However, all existing methods fo-
cus on creating adversarial perturbations on either the entire
image or the object itself. An intuitive question to ask is:
can adversarial perturbations be added solely on the back-
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Figure 1. Visual illustration of the background patch attack on ob-
ject detectors. (a) Original image. (b) Adversarial background
patches, amplified by a factor of 30 for visualization. (c) Perturbed
image. (d, f) Detection results of (a, c) using Faster-RCNN [28]
respectively. (e) Zoom-in of the false positives “person” and “TV”
in (d). Red boxes in (d) denote miss detections.
ground to achieve similar vulnerability? We will address
this very problem in this paper. Specifically, we explore the
vulnerability of the single shot feedforward network in the
state-of-the-art two-stage [28] and single-stage object de-
tectors [26, 19, 18, 16] and show that the mechanism can be
corrupted by adding imperceptible perturbations on a few
small background patches, which can not only decrease true
positives of detected objects, but also increase false posi-
tives in the background. Figure 1 shows a visual illustration
of this approach. Looking forward, how to address the vul-
nerability of modern object detectors explored in this work
will be a critical open issue, as applications including au-
tonomous driving and AI medical image analysis demand
highly reliable and trustworthy object detectors [1].
Mainstream CNN based object detectors call into two
categories: two-stage and single-stage object detectors. The
Single Shot Module (SSM) refers to the Region Proposal
Network (RPN) in the two-stage object detectors or the
single-stage object detector itself. Since the SSM makes
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Figure 2. Overview. (a) Original image. (b) Background patches generated by our method. (c) Base-network, which is the RPN for two-
stage object detectors or the single-stage object detector itself. (d) Output of SSM, where the red box and black box denote a false positive
and a true positive, respectively. Our attack can disrupt the top ranked results by decreasing true positives and increasing false positives.
(e) denotes the top ranked results, which are the object proposals for two-stage object detectors or the detections for single-stage object
detectors. (f) Sub-network of two-stage object detectors for class labels prediction and shape refinements.
use of excessive convolutions in multiple layers, the recep-
tive field is often much larger than the object size. This
is precisely how contextual information outside the objects
can be leveraged to improve detection. However, this prop-
erty also makes SSM vulnerable for attacks coming from
the background. If SSM was corrupted, no correct object
proposals or detections will be generated, therefore leading
to large errors.
In this paper, we propose a novel method to generate ad-
versarial background patches to attack SSM. Our method
finds effective locations and shape for background patches
to create adversarial perturbations inside, which not only
decreases the true positives, but also dramatically increases
the false positives in the background. To the best of our
knowledge, most existing works focused on disrupting the
true positives, and very few address the false positives —
which, in our view, is equally important regarding vulner-
ability in practical use, see Figure 1(e). Our method can
effectively corrupt the SSM output ranking, such that false
positives can be pushed ahead of true positives, see Fig-
ure 2(d-e). Our adversarial background patch attack aims
at achieving the following three aspects: (1) decreasing the
classification scores of correct detections, (2) corrupting the
shape offset regression which shifts the localization (shape
and location) of the correct detections, and (3) increasing
the (non-background) object class scores that should not
come up in the background. Our background patch attack
generation can be cast as an optimization problem by min-
imizing the combination of the following three loss terms:
(1) True Positive Class (TPC) loss, which characterizes the
correct class scores of the true positives; (2) True Positive
Shape (TPS) loss, which represents the correctness of shape
offset regression of the true positives; (3) False Positive
Class (FPC) loss, which characterizes the non-background
class scores of false positive arisen from the background.
The combination of these three loss terms can be minimized
using iterative gradient descent, such that the desired quan-
tities regarding adversarial background patches (pixels, lo-
cation and shape) can be calculated.
To demonstrate the efficacy of our method, we conduct
experiments on the MS COCO 2014 dataset [17] by attack-
ing 5 mainstream two-stage object detectors and 8 single-
stage object detectors. We conducted ablation studies in-
vestigating the vulnerability effects with respect to the fol-
lowing factors, and show how they can affect the degraded
performance: (1) distance between generated background
patches and the object of interest, (2) scale of the object to
be detected, and (3) distances between objects.
The contributions can be summarized as four-fold:
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to explore
the vulnerability of two-stage and single-stage object de-
tectors by adding imperceptible adversarial perturbations
on small patches in background.
• Our background patch attack can effectively decrease true
positives and increase false positives in the background.
• We conduct comprehensive experiments on mainstream
object detectors (5 two-stage and and 8 single-stage ones)
to expose their vulnerability.
• Our method can generate ‘targeted’ false positives of a
given class in the background (§4.2), which can cause se-
rious vulnerability, e.g, to force a autonomous driving de-
tector to trigger false pedestrian detections.
2. Related Works
Object Detectors detect objects of interest in an image
by producing bounding boxes and class labels. The state-
of-the-art object detectors are deep neural network based,
where the network architecture consists of either a single-
stage forward pass [26, 19, 18, 16] or a two-stage pipeline
[9, 8, 28]. The two-stage object detector first generates ob-
ject proposals, and then predict class labels and refine the
shapes and locations of the proposals. Faster-RCNN [28] is
the very recent two-stage object detector, which improves
the detection efficiency by using a Region Proposal Net-
work (RPN) to generate object proposals. The RPN is es-
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sentially a fully convolutional neural network (FCN), which
generates all object proposals in a single forward pass. First
a set of anchor boxes are identified, then object proposals
are generated by estimating the location and shape of each
anchor box with confidence scores. The top ranked object
proposals will be selected for further classification and re-
finement. RPNs are effective and widely used in current
two-stage object detectors. In comparison, single-stage ob-
ject detectors [26, 19, 18, 16] can be viewed as an upgraded
version of RPNs, where all detections are generated in a sin-
gle forward pass (without generating proposals). Instead of
predicting the confidence scores of the object proposals in
RPN, single-stage object detectors directly predict the clas-
sification score for each detection.
Adversarial Attacks for Image Classifiers. Adversarial
perturbations are intentionally designed noises that are im-
perceptible to human observers, yet can seriously reduce the
deep neural network performance if added to the input im-
age. Many methods [30, 10, 14, 25, 24, 23, 33, 22, 2] have
been proposed to impair image classifiers by adding adver-
sarial perturbations on the entire image. Recently, [6, 3]
show that adversarial attacks can be generated in the phys-
ical world, using printable “stickers” that can be put on the
objects in the scene to fool image classifiers. These stickers
are clearly identifiable from human eyes but not the ma-
chines. The work of [13] generates an artificial adversar-
ial patch in the background that is notable to human eyes
but can cripple machine image classification. In contract,
our method provides more sophisticated attacks on object
detection, and the perturbation is imperceptible to human
eyes.
Adversarial Attacks for Object Detectors. Recent re-
search also explores the vulnerability of object detectors
with extended network architectures [20, 32, 7, 4, 15]. Ob-
ject detection is widely used in practical applications such
as autonomous driving, thus the impact of attack vs. vul-
nerability is greater. In [20], adversarial perturbations are
added to the stop-sign and face images that can cripple their
detections. The dense adversary generation in [32] itera-
tively impairs both object detection and semantic segmen-
tation. A physical adversarial perturbation method is pro-
posed in [4] to attack Faster-RCNN based stop-sign detec-
tor. The work [7] extends [4] to other detectors such as
YOLO, in that a physical adversarial sticker can cripple the
stop-sign detection. The robust adversarial perturbations in
[15] corrupts deep proposal-based object detectors and in-
stance segmentation methods by attacking the RPN, thus
only two-stage networks are attacked. All aforementioned
methods focus on adding adversarial perturbations on the
entire image or the object itself. Moreover, these methods
have no intention to attack on the aspect of increasing false
positives, their goal is solely on decreasing the true posi-
tives. In contrast, our adversarial attack is more universal
in that: (1) most modern object detectors including both
single-stage and two-stage ones are covered, (2) both the
true and false positives of the detection are explicitly im-
paired, and (3) the added perturbation is imperceptible and
only on the small patches in background.
3. Methods
Our method can generate imperceptible background
patches, which can effectively damage mainstream CNN
object detectors, by simultaneously decreasing true posi-
tives and increasing false positives in background. The
true positives will be corrupted with decreased classifica-
tion score and largely shifted localization (shape and lo-
cation). The false positives will be exacerbated with in-
creased (non-background) class scores that should not come
up in the background. Our approach can be formulated as
the minimization of three loss terms: True Positive Class
(TPC) loss, True Positive Shape (TPS) loss and False Pos-
itive Class (FPC) loss, which we will formally define in
§3.2-3.4. The loss minimization can be computed using it-
erative gradient descent in §3.5, where the variables of un-
known are the pixel perturbations and localization (shape
and location) of the background patches.
Our attack method works in a ‘white-box’ manner, i.e,
we assume that it has access to network parameter for back-
propagation gradient computation.
3.1. Notations and Problem Formulation
Let I denote the input image, {b¯i = (x¯i, y¯i, w¯i, h¯i), i =
1, ..., N} denote the N ground truth bounding boxes {b¯i}
for the objects of interest in image I, where (x¯i, y¯i) are
the box center coordinates, (w¯i, h¯i) are their widths and
heights, respectively. Let {0, ..., C} denote the set of class
labels, where 0 is the background class, and C + 1 is the
number of classes. Specifically, for two-stage object detec-
tors, C = 1 as the focus is to attack RPN, only the two
classes of background/object need to be considered. 1
Let F denote the Single Shot Module (SSM) with fixed
model parameters. Let F(I) = {(scj , bj), j = 1, ...,M}
denote the SSM results of either RPN object proposals or
single-stage detections on image I 2, where scj denote the
score of class c after softmax, bj denote the bounding box
of the j-th detection, and M is the number of SSM pro-
posals/detections. Let bj = (xj , yj , wj , hj), where (xj , yj)
are the box center coordinates, and (wj , hj) are their widths
and heights, respectively. Let Q = {(x˜k, y˜k, w˜k, h˜k), k =
1, ...,K} denote the adversarial background patches, with
locations specified by (x˜k, y˜k) and shapes specified by
(w˜k, h˜k); K is the number of background patches that will
1 Note that our method does not require the original ground truth la-
beling (used for detector training). In practice, we can use the first test
detection results as the ground truth to compute the three loss terms.
2We denote object proposals as detections hereafter for simplicity.
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be added for attack. Let I  Q denote the masked pixel
regions on image I specified by the background patchesQ.
Our goal is to generate background patches with small
pixel changes that can disrupt SSM. The adversarial attack
is then the search of both the background patch geometry
(location, size and shape) and pixel changes to be altered.
We formulate this optimization as the minimization of three
loss terms: TPC denoted as Ltpc, TPS as Lshape, and FPC
as Lfpc. To maximize adversarial attack effects, while min-
imizing any distortion to the input image I, we control the
amount of pixel change inside the background patches Q,
by employing the Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR), a
widely used metric for human perception of image quality.
Smaller distortion leads to higher PSNR value. Specifically,
the adversarial background patch can be produced by mini-
mizing the following loss function w.r.t. I Q, considering
the location and shape of the background patchesQ and the
included pixel value I  Q as variables:
min
IQ
{Ltpc(I  Q;F) + Lshape(I  Q;F)+
Lfpc(I  Q;F)} , s.t. PSNR(I  Q) ≥ ,
(1)
where  is the lower bound of PSNR. Compared to a re-
cent work [15] which creates adversarial perturbations on
the entire image to decrease true positives, our method cre-
ates adversarial perturbations only in selected background
patches and can largely increase false positives as well.
3.2. True Positive Class (TPC) Loss
Our approach attacks detectors by only introducing
changes in the background. Since the sum of all class scores
is 1, the attack of decreasing the score of the correct class
c can be alternatively achieved by increasing the score of
another running up class cˆ, such that scˆ > sc invalidates a
good detection. To make this attack most effective, we try to
increase the score of the running up class cˆ with the largest
score scˆ among all classes except c, i.e, cˆ ∈ {0, ..., C}/{c}.
This running up detection selection considers the follow-
ing criteria: (1) detection bj with IoU overlapping with its
ground truth box greater than threshold 0.5, and (2) class
score scj greater than threshold 0.1. Let zj = 1 for the
detection bj satisfying the above two criteria, and zj = 0
otherwise. The TPC loss Ltpc sums up the cross entropy of
scores from the selected running up detections zj among all
M detections:
Ltpc(I  Q;F) = −
∑M
j=1 zj log(s
cˆ
j). (2)
Minimizing Eq.(2) increases score scˆ from an incorrect
class that can effectively invalidates true positives.
3.3. True Positive Shape (TPS) Loss
Shape regression is an important step to refine the lo-
calization of detections (or proposals), where the locations
and shapes of anchor boxes are adjusted to match the corre-
sponding ground truth boxes, by expressing the localization
in terms of offsets. In general, CNN object detectors are vul-
nerable under attack at the shape regression step, even when
the classification is functioning perfectly, as good detec-
tions will be pushed away from their desired locations. The
TPS loss is designed to push away the predicted localization
from the correct ones. Let ∆xj ,∆yj ,∆wj ,∆hj denote
the predicted offset in terms of object center and bounding
box size. Let ∆x¯j ,∆y¯j ,∆w¯j ,∆h¯j denote the true offset
between the corresponding anchor boxes and ground truth
boxes. The TPS loss Lshape sums up the squared offset
differences of selected true positives under the criteria zj
defined in § 3.2 among all M detections:
Lshape(I  Q;F) = exp
[
−∑Mj=1 zj ·(
(∆xj −∆x¯j)2 + (∆yj −∆y¯j)2
+(∆wj −∆w¯j)2 + (∆hj −∆h¯j)2
)]
.
(3)
Minimizing Eq.(3) encourages pushing the predicted
offsets ∆xj ,∆yj ,∆wj ,∆hj away from the true offsets
∆x¯j ,∆y¯j ,∆w¯j ,∆h¯j , to corrupt the predicted localization
of bj . Note that in contrast to [15] which disrupts the shape
offset regression by pushing the localization toward a large
constant value, here we directly optimize against known
ground truth values, which should be more effective.
3.4. False Positive Class (FPC) Loss
We introduce FPC as a novel loss term to strengthen the
attack that can corrupt detectors by increasing false posi-
tives in the background. In the case without attack, the
background should only contain detections (or proposals)
with high scores belonging to the background class. To
make detectors generate false positives, the attack should
make the score of an object class c′ ∈ {1, ..., C} greater
than that of the background class 0, (i.e, sc
′
> s0), to push
the incorrect detections ahead to the top. The red box in
Figure 2 (d-e) shows one such example. To make such at-
tack most effective, we propose to try pushing forward the
class instance c′ with the largest score among {1, ..., C}
in the FPC loss design. Specifically, since the goal is to
create false positives in the background, only detections bj
satisfying the following conditions need to be considered:
(1) detection bj without overlapping with any ground truth
box (i.e, fully in the background), and (2) detection bj with
IoU overlapping with the generated background patches Q
greater than threshold 0.1. Let rj = 1 for the detection bj
satisfying the above criteria, and rj = 0 otherwise. The
FPC loss Lfpc sums up the cross entropy of the selected rj
scores among all M detections:
Lfpc(I  Q;F) = −
∑M
j=1 rj log(s
c′
j ). (4)
Minimizing Eq.(4) encourages to increase the score sc
′
j
4
of some incorrect object class in the background, which
thereby creates false positives.
3.5. Background Patches Generation
Our method generates and refines the adversarial back-
ground patches in the overall loss optimization iterations.
We describes how the background patches are initialized,
and how they can be expanded and refined, according to the
framework in Eq.(1) incorporating the three loss terms. Di-
rect minimization of the loss function in Eq.(1) with respect
to I  Q is difficult. Thus, we employ a standard iterative
optimization scheme using gradient descent.
In general, an object detector finds multiple objects, and
the closer the objects are, the greater their receptive fields
overlap. This suggests that a single adversarial background
patch can corrupt the detection of multiple objects, as long
as the background patch are close enough to them. To se-
lect where best to put in background patches for most effec-
tive adversarial attack, we consider the spatial distribution
of the objects and the potential locations, shapes, and sizes
of background patches. We start with clustering the objects
of interest into groups based on their spatial distances within
the image. For each group, we empirically generate nb = 3
background patches as initialization.
Algorithm 1 lists the pseudo code of our adversarial im-
age generation procedure. We first compute the gradient of
the overall loss term w.r.t. It as Gt =
∇It [Ltpc(It;F) + Lshape(It;F) + Lfpc(It;F)] (5)
where t denote the iteration number. 3 We next describe
how the background patches Q are initialized and updated.
Initial background patches: We consider candidates of
background patches for each targeted object, with size
initialized to 0.2 of the object size, and aspect ratios
(1, 0.67, 0.75, 1.5, 1.33). Sliding windows are used to se-
lect, for each object group, the best location and shape of the
background patches Q0, according the the following crite-
ria: (1) The distance between background patch and objects
should not be less than a threshold, as 0.2 of the largest
object box side. (2) The patch with largest sum of Gt gradi-
ent intensities is preferred. (3) No selected patches should
overlap. Such patch selection repeats until nb background
patches are obtained for each group.
Expanding background patches: In the subsequent iter-
ations t > 0, Qt expends from Qt−1 with a small stride
(0.02 of the shorter side of I) in one of the 4 possible di-
rections (left, right, top, down). The extension direction is
determined by the one where Gt gradient intensity inQt in-
creases the most. In our method the background patch only
expands (no shrinking) in the iterations until termination.
3 Note that we omit theQ term from Eq.(1) in this gradient formula, as
It implies the IQmasking has already been performed in the iterations.
Algorithm 1 Background Patch Generation
Input: SSM model F ; input image I; maximal iteration T
1: I0 = I, t = 0
2: while t < T and
∑M
j=1 zj 6= 0 do
3: Gt = ∇It [Ltpc(It;F) + Lshape(It;F) + Lfpc(It;F)]
4: if t = 0 then
5: Q0 ← initial background patches
6: else
7: Qt ← expanded background patches
8: Pt = Gt Qt . perturbation in background patches
9: Pˆt = λ||Pt||2 · Pt . perturbation normalization
10: It+1 = clip(It − Pˆt) . update I with pixel clipping
11: if PSNR(It+1 Qt) < ε then
12: break
13: t = t+ 1
Output: Adversarial perturbed image It
The adversarial image perturbations at iteration t is de-
noted as Pt, which can be calculated as the intersection of
the gradient image Gt of the overall loss and the current
background patchesQt, i.e, Pt = GtQ. A L2 normalized
perturbation Pˆt is then calculated to update the adversarial
image It, using scale parameter λ = 30. The adversarial
perturbed image It is then clipped into [0, 255].
The optimization iteration continues until any of the fol-
lowing condition is reached: (1) maximal iteration T = 250
is reached, (2) no true positive selection are available for
TPS and TPS, i.e,
∑M
j=1 zj = 0 or (3) the RSNR(I Q) is
less than a maximal image distortion threshold . Since the
PSNR in lossy image compression is typically between 30
to 50 dB [31], we empirically set  = 35 dB for two-stage
object detectors and  = 30 dB for single-stage ones.
4. Experiments
We perform experimental evaluations of the proposed
adversarial attacks on mainstream object detectors. §4.1 de-
scribes details on attacking 5 two-stage object detectors and
8 single-stage ones. §4.2 describes the ‘targeted’ false posi-
tives attack as a novel attacking scheme, where the user can
specify a desired class be produced by the attacked detector.
§4.3 evaluates the transferring ability of the proposed attack
method among common network architectures. §4.4 per-
forms three ablation studies on major factors that can affect
performance.
4.1. Experimental Setup
MS COCO 2014 dataset [17] is used to evaluate the per-
formance of the background patch attack. It contains 80
object class and a background class. We randomly select
2000 images from MS COCO 2014 validation set for ex-
periments. The detection performance is evaluated using
“mean average precision” (mAP) metric [5] at Intersection-
over-Union (IoU) threshold 0.5 and 0.7.
Experiments are conducted for 5 two-stage object de-
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No Noise Random TPC TPS TPC+TPS FPC TPC+TPS+FPC
FR-v16 [28] 62.4/48.7 62.5/48.9 50.7/38.8 51.2/38.0 48.1/37.4 50.7/38.3 41.9/32.7
FR-mn 46.1/32.9 46.4/32.9 31.6/22.5 34.6/21.2 32.3/22.8 36.0/26.4 26.6/19.3
FR-rn50 64.7/52.7 64.7/52.2 47.7/40.1 47.2/35.1 47.3/39.5 52.2/43.9 39.8/33.4
FR-rn101 66.0/56.0 65.8/55.7 39.9/32.4 42.0/29.8 40.4/33.0 53.9/48.5 36.2/31.2
FR-rn152 70.0/60.0 69.1/58.9 38.3/30.1 42.3/27.2 37.2/27.7 56.0/48.3 36.8/31.7
SSD-rn50 [19] 46.6/37.2 47.2/37.1 39.7/30.0 37.4/25.4 38.8/28.8 33.9/28.8 27.9/20.9
SSD-v16 48.3/37.0 47.8/37.1 36.9/26.4 31.0/18.0 36.3/24.6 26.2/21.9 24.5/17.4
RFB-rn50 [18] 48.9/40.3 48.7/41.2 36.2/27.4 43.7/38.4 37.0/27.1 31.6/27.7 26.1/20.5
RFB-v16 48.3/37.9 46.5/37.3 32.9/23.8 32.3/19.2 32.3/22.5 30.2/25.1 26.0/19.4
YOLO2-mn [26] 46.6/30.4 45.4/29.9 35.7/23.1 26.9/15.4 35.3/22.1 23.6/17.5 22.3/15.3
YOLO3-mn [27] 49.0/36.0 49.6/36.5 40.0/28.5 33.9/20.7 39.5/26.1 32.7/25.5 33.3/21.8
FSSD-rn50 [16] 51.2/41.5 51.4/42.2 39.8/29.7 38.3/27.2 38.4/27.6 31.7/31.3 28.8/20.8
FSSD-v16 54.0/44.2 53.9/43.5 38.5/28.4 31.8/19.8 38.0/26.8 35.4/31.0 33.5/24.1
Table 1. Performance of background patches attack on 5 two-stage object detectors with 5 different Region Proposal Networks (RPNs) and
8 single-stage object detectors at mAP 0.5 and 0.7. No Noise denotes the original performance without adding noise. Random denotes
the performance of adding random noises on patches. TPC, TPS, TPC+TPS, FPC and TPC+TPS+FPC denote the performance using
corresponding loss terms respectively. Lower value denotes better attacking performance.
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Figure 3. Performance of background patch attacks at mAP 0.5 on 5 two-stage object detectors as the distance between background patches
and objects (x-axis, normalized to [0, 1]) increases. We do not consider FPC, as it is an independent factor here.
tectors and 8 single-stage ones. For simplicity, we denote
the base networks of these object detectors as: vgg16
(v16) [29] , mobilenet (mn) [12], resnet50 (rn50),
resnet101 (rn101) and resnet152 (rn152) [11].
For two-stage object detectors, we tested Faster-RCNN
(FR) [28] based on 5 different RPNs: 4 FR-v16, FR-mn,
FR-rn50, FR-rn101 and FR-rn152. For single-stage ob-
ject detectors, we tested SSD [19], YOLO2 [26], YOLO3
[27], RFB [18] and FSSD [16] on different base networks:
SSD-v16, SSD-rn50, RFB-v16, RFB-rn50, YOLO2-mn,
YOLO3-mn, FSSD-v16 and FSSD-rn50.
We evaluated five combinations of loss functions:
(1) TPC, (2) TPS, (3) TPC+TPS, (4) FPC and (5)
TPC+TPS+FPC. We added a Random baseline experi-
ment for comparison, where random noise under normal
distribution with the same distortion as in our method is
added to the background patches.
Table 1 shows the detection performances under attack.
Random noise barely affects the performance of object de-
tectors. The performance decreases notably under the ad-
versarial attacks. TPC+TPS considers both aspects to dis-
rupt true positives. We observe that the performance of
TPC+TPS is in between TPC and TPS. Our explanation is
that, since the amount of distortion is limited, minimizing
4As the RPNs use the same base network with detectors, we use the
name of base network to denote different RPNs
the TPC+TPS loss could stop earlier than the cases only
minimizing TPC or TPS individually. TPS is less effective
in two-stage object detectors than the single-stage ones, as
the shape offset attack can be mitigated by the later shape
refinement in the sub-network of two-stage detectors. FPC
largely reduces the performance of both kinds of detectors,
due to the increased false positives. The combined loss of
TPC+TPS+FPC achieves the best performance, which de-
creases the performance by ∼ 42% at mAP 0.5 and ∼ 40%
at mAP 0.7 for two-stage object detectors, ∼ 42% at mAP
0.5 and ∼ 47% at mAP 0.7 for single-stage detectors. Fig-
ure 5 illustrates two examples of FR-mn and FSSD-rn50
using overall loss TPC+TPS+FPC. The bottle (red box) in
FR-mn is not detected, while a “person” (orange box) is
yielded in background. The bear (red box) in FSSD-rn50 is
classified correctly, yet the box shape is disturbed. Also, a
“person” and a “skateboard“ are yielded in the background.
4.2. Targeted False Positives
The ‘targeted’ false positives is an important adversarial
attack scheme in practice, with the goal to force a detector
to mistakenly generate a false positive having specific given
class. For example, to corrupt a traffic monitoring detectors
to generate false positives of pedestrians in the background,
that can greatly weaken the trustworthiness of the detector.
Our method can generate targeted false positives using
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Figure 4. Performance of background patch attacks at mAP 0.5 and mAP 0.7 at different object scales on 5 two-stage object detectors.
SG 1 - SG 4 denote the 4 object groups sorted based on their size in ascending order.
(FR-mn) (FSSD-rn50)
+
Person: 0.831 Person: 0.616 Skateboard: 0.833
+
(a) (b)
(c)(d)
(b)
(c)
(a)
(d)
Figure 5. Visual illustration of background patches attacks on FR-
mn and FSSD-rn50. (a) Original detection results. (b) Back-
ground patches generated using TPC+TPS+FPC. (c) Detection
results of adding (b) to the original image. Red boxes denote the
true positives are not detected correctly. Specifically, the bottle in
FR-mn is not detected, and the bounding box of bear in FSSD-
rn50 is shifted. Orange boxes in (c) denote the created false posi-
tives. (d) Zoom-in area in (c).
Targeted FPC Target FPC
SSD-rn50 44.7/35.0 YOLO2-mn 38.7/26.0
SSD-v16 46.4/35.1 YOLO3-mn 44.8/32.3
RFB-rn50 45.9/38.8 FSSD-rn50 48.9/38.9
RFB-v16 43.9/34.2 FSSD-v16 47.5/38.0
Table 2. Performance of “person” false positives attack on the 8
single-stage object detectors.
Eq.(4) with a specified class, e.g, “person”. Figure 6 illus-
trates an example of the “person” targeted false positives
attack, where many “person” detections appear in the back-
ground. Table 2 shows the performance of the “person” tar-
geted false positives attack on 8 single-stage object detec-
tors, where the detection performance decreases by ∼ 8%
at mAP 0.5 and ∼ 9% at mAP 0.7. This indicates that tar-
geted false positive attack is more challenging than an ‘un-
targeted’ attack, where the performance largely drops by
∼ 38% at mAP 0.5 and ∼ 32% at mAP 0.7, as shown in
Table 1.
4.3. Transferring Study
We study the transferring ability (how adversarial attacks
generated on one detector can be used to attack another
detector), to further explore the properties of vulnerabil-
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 6. Visual example of “person” targeted false positives on
SSD-v16. (a) Background patches generated using FPC loss func-
tion. (b) Detection result by adding (a). (c) Zoom-in illustration of
“person” false positives.
ity among common network architectures. Table 3 reports
the attack on 4 two-stage detectors and 4 single-stage ones.
Our attack can transfer to similar network architectures.
Background patches generated from FR-rn50 and FR-152
are more effective to FR-101 than FR-v16. Background
patches generated from YOLO3-mn can also be effective
to YOLO2-mn. The transferring ability between different
base networks are weaker. Also, two-stage and single-stage
object detectors can barely transfer attack from each other.
4.4. Ablation Study
Ablation studies are performed to investigate the vulner-
ability of detectors under the proposed attack approach in
the following three aspects that can affect performance.
Distance between background patches and objects of in-
terest: We investigate the effectiveness of adding back-
ground patches at arbitrary location inside its theoretically
receptive field. We normalize the distance between back-
ground patches and object to [0, 1] by dividing the longest
edge of object. We conduct experiments on 5 two-stage ob-
ject detectors to show the detection performance decrease
with distance between background patches and objects in-
creases. Since FPC has no relation with the distance, we
only consider three loss terms (TPC, TPS and TPC+TPS).
Figure 3 illustrates the detection performance decrease as
the distance between background patches and objects in-
creases. We observe that larger distance, less performance
decrease. Thus despite the receptive field is theoretically
very large, the effectiveness of background patches attack
gradually decreases as the distance increases, which is con-
sistent with the explanation of receptive field in CNN [34].
We illustrate the background patches attack for FR-rn152
with distance increasing in Figure 7. The left person in im-
age is gradually detected out as the distance increases.
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FR-v16 FR-rn50 FR-rn101 FR-rn152 SSD-v16 SSD-rn50 YOLO2-mn YOLO3-mn
No Noise 62.4/48.7 64.7/52.7 66.0/56.0 70.0/60.0 48.3/37.0 46.6/37.2 46.6/30.4 49.0/36.0
FR-v16 41.9/32.7 61.6/49.8 63.0/54.3 67.8/57.9 46.7/35.6 46.2/36.7 44.5/30.4 48.7/35.1
FR-rn50 60.3/47.4 39.8/33.4 62.0/53.6 67.6/57.1 47.8/36.0 46.4/36.5 45.5/30.2 48.5/35.2
FR-rn101 62.2/48.0 60.7/49.6 36.2/31.2 66.3/55.4 47.7/36.3 46.5/36.8 47.1/30.8 48.3/35.1
FR-rn152 61.9/46.3 60.0/48.3 59.5/61.0 36.8/31.7 47.6/36.1 46.8/36.8 44.8/30.3 48.8/35.3
SSD-v16 60.3/48.3 64.2/52.3 65.1/56.1 69.5/59.7 24.5/17.4 45.4/36.4 46.5/30.5 48.3/36.2
SSD-rn50 61.4/48.1 64.3/52.8 65.4/56.2 70.4/60.4 47.5/35.4 27.9/20.9 46.5/30.4 49.1/36.1
YOLO2-mn 61.6/48.8 64.4/52.4 65.6/56.7 69.7/59.6 47.8/35.8 46.6/36.9 22.3/15.3 45.6/32.9
YOLO3-mn 61.7/48.9 64.5/51.8 64.7/56.3 70.0/59.6 47.8/36.6 46.5/36.0 39.9/27.7 33.3/21.3
Table 3. Performance of transferring attacks between 8 object detectors (4 two-stage and 4 single-stage). The row denotes where the
background patches are generated from, and the column denotes each object detectors.
0.2 0.4 0.6
(a)
(b)
Figure 7. (a) Original detection result of FR-rn152. (b) Detection
result as the distance between background patches and objects in-
creases (0.2-0.6). Person in the left is gradually detected as the
distance increases.
Object scales: We investigate how much object scales can
affect the performance of the background patch attack. We
cluster objects appeared in images into 4 groups, which is
denoted by SG 1 - SG 4 sorted by their size in ascending
order. Then we conduct experiments on 5 two-stage object
detectors to show the attacking performance on each group.
Table 4 shows the detection performance before and after
background patches attack on different object scale. The
first row of each object detectors denotes the original de-
tection performance, the second row denotes the detection
performance after background patches attack. For better vi-
sualization, we plot the detection performance decrease ra-
tio in Figure 4, y-axis is the detection performance decrease
ratio. We observe that small objects are easier to be dis-
turbed than large objects. This may be due to the fact that
the convolution kernel size is fixed in each layer, so that the
more context in surrounding background of small object can
be seen compared to large object.
Distance between objects of interest: We observe a direct
relation between the number of patches and the distance be-
tween objects. In particular, the smaller distances among
objects, the fewer background patches are needed to suc-
cessfully disturb the detections. We hypothesize it is also
caused by the effect of receptive field. Specifically, when
the objects are close to each other, their receptive fields also
overlap, which implies that one patch can impact the detec-
tion of more than one object. We conduct experiments on
SG 1 SG 2 SG 3 SG 4
FR-v16 19.5/14.4 29.2/24.3 35.5/31.9 64.1/54.44.4/2.7 6.1/4.6 17.4/14.6 60.7/52.9
FR-mn 10.1/5.1 21.4/16.9 30.2/24.8 61.0/46.10.7/0.4 5.4/4.6 9.5/6.1 54.1/44.5
FR-rn50 20.1/14.3 29.6/24.7 39.5/36.7 70.4/62.52.7/1.0 6.2/5.1 14.2/11.7 64.3/59.1
FR-rn101 18.3/12.1 32.3/28.6 39.1/35.0 68.9/67.23.7/1.5 6.6/5.3 9.1/7.2 47.6/44.4
FR-rn152 20.0/15.7 30.8/26.6 41.7/38.3 72.0/69.64.6/2.7 7.7/5.0 11.1/7.8 43.2/35.7
Table 4. Performance of 5 two-stage object detectors before and
after (marked as bold) background patches attack on different ob-
ject scale at mAP 0.5 and 0.7. SG 1 - SG 4 denote the 4 object
groups sorted based on their size in ascending order.
DG 1 DG 2 DG 3 DG 4 DG 5
Distance 0.55 0.30 0.23 0.18 0.09
Patches 3 1.79 1.49 1.23 1.22
Table 5. Number of patches per object as the distance between
objects decreases. DG 1 - DG 5 denote the 5 groups sorted based
on distance between objects in descending order.
5 two-stage object detectors to validate our hypothesis. We
normalize the mean object distance to [0, 1] by dividing the
minimal dimension of image and we categorize all test im-
ages into 5 groups with different mean object distance and
find out the mean number of background patches needed
per object. As shown in Table 5, the number of patches per
object reduces as the mean distance between objects in one
image decreases. DG 1 - DG 5 denote the 5 groups which
have mean object distance in a descending order.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we explore the vulnerability of Single
Shot Module (SSM) in mainstream object detectors, by
adding imperceptible adversarial perturbations on small
background patches outside the object. Our background
patches attack can largely decrease the true positives and
increase false positives in the background. Experiments on
MS COCO 2014 dataset by attacking 5 two-stage object
detectors and 8 single-stage ones demonstrate the efficacy.
Future work includes the improvement of the optimization
process and extension to attack black-box models.
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